Chapter 2A: Decision-making Processes
(an additional chapter)
The following chapter was included in an earlier version of this text. Reviewers suggested that it be removed, but some students have since suggested that they would like more information about decision trees and game theory. The discussion of how to use decision trees has been included in Appendix 3 of the text. However, the following material includes more case examples and possible exercises.
Conflict resolution processes are essentially methods of decision making. Your choice of conflict intervention depends upon your understanding of how people make decisions. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, one theory of decision making is based on conflict styles. Individuals have different predilections regarding how they deal with conflict: avoiding, accommodating, compromising, competing, and collaborating. If you recognize that someone is avoiding conflict, your can tailor an intervention to help that person deal with conflict more directly. In this chapter, I present other models of decision making that are commonly used in negotiation, mediation and advocacy. The following section surveys the range of decision-making theories. The balance of the chapter focuses on two tools for analyzing decision making, Decision Tree Analysis and Game Theory.
Rational and Non-rational Decision Making
Consider the following scenario.
You are working with two parents and their teenaged son, Simba. The parents are frustrated because Simba won’t listen to them. Simba is frustrated because his parents are too restrictive. Simba says, "That’s it. You’ll never change. I’m leaving home." The parents respond, "Good. You just cause problems, anyhow. We’re throwing you out."
How do you make sense of this situation? Why does Simba say he is leaving home? Why do his parents encourage him to go? Rational decision-making theorists suggest that people make decisions based upon reasonable assessments of their self-interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Accordingly, Simba chooses to do what is in his self-interest. Weighing the positives and negatives of living at home versus moving out on his own, Simba decides it is best for him to leave. Similarly, his parents assess the situation and decide that they are better off if Simba leaves. Conflict resolved (apparently).
Critics of rational choice theory suggest that people are not merely economic beings, whose behavior can be explained by rational cost-benefit assessments and self-serving choices. Rather, human decisions are often determined by values, affect and habit (Zey, 1992). Simba values personal freedom. His parents value tranquility. These are not rational choices. Why would Simba choose to leave the safety and security of his parents’ home, to live a risky and uncertain life on the streets? His non-rational value for freedom overshadows the rational benefits of staying at home. But why would his parents encourage Simba to leave? Affect may explain. Simba’s parents are frustrated and angry. If they were thinking rationally, they would try to work out an arrangement so that Simba could continue living with them. In the heat of the moment, they say something out of anger. Once they say this, they are too embarrassed to take it back and apologize. Alternatively, their non-rational behavior could be explained by habit. In this family, people have learned to deal with conflict by arguing and yelling at one another. Telling Simba to go is an automatic response, rather than a reasoned one.
The forgoing analysis, though somewhat contrived, demonstrates how human decision making can be understood from a range of perspectives. In addition to the perspectives illustrated above, helping professionals can draw upon personality theories, drive theories, developmental theories, social construction, behaviorism, systems theories, structuralism, humanism, and so on:
| Personality theories suggest that people have deep-rooted character traits. These traits are either innate or acquired through psychodynamic processes (Freud, 1963; Sandole & van der Merwe, 1993). A person with a compulsive personality makes decisions that provide constancy, structure and order. A person with an impulsive personality tends to make decisions spontaneously. If Simba has an impulsive personality, his decision to leave is made on the spur of the moment, without thinking. |
| Drive theories suggest that choices are determined by inner drives, involuntary processes which direct an individual to satisfy certain needs. Maslow (1987) suggests that individuals must satisfy basic needs (such as food, shelter and security) before becoming free to make choices to satisfy higher level needs (such as social relationships and self-actualization). If Simba is unable to acquire food and security while living on the streets, he will sacrifice his need for autonomy and return home to satisfy his more basic needs. |
| Developmental theories suggest that people go through a series of phases in their lives, with different needs and challenges at each stage (Erikson, 1950). As an adolescent, Simba is striving to establish his own identity. Simba’s decision to live on the streets provides him with separation from his parents, giving him room to make his own choices and mistakes. In the process, he develops a sense of who he is and what he stands for. |
| Social construction theories propose that individuals make choices based on how they interpret and make sense of the world (Smith, 1990; Broome, 1993). Simba interprets his parents’ house rules as undue restrictions on his freedom. If he interpreted these rules as symbols of parental care and love, he would choose to stay at home. |
| Behaviorism submits that decisions can be explained by learning processes such as classical conditioning, operant conditioning or modeling (Sandole & van der Merwe, 1993). In classical conditioning, a person learns to associate a particular stimulus with a particular response. Each time Simba hears his parents yell, he becomes tense and withdraws from the situation. The sound of yelling becomes a trigger for Simba to withdraw. Operant conditioning suggests that individuals are more likely to repeat behaviors that have been positively reinforced, rather than punished or not reinforced. When Simba leaves home, his parents go out to find him and bring him back. They treat him nicely in order to encourage him to stay. Simba learns that leaving home will make his parents indulge him. Modeling theory purports that an individual learns by observing parents or other significant people in the individual’s life. Simba’s older sister ran away from home when she was a teenager. For Simba, running away from home does not seem unusual, since his sister did the same thing. |
| Systems theories, as noted in Chapter 1, suggest that the choices of one individual are dependent upon interactions with others in the system (Corey, 1996). If Simba stays home after the verbal argument, nothing will change. His parents will continue to impose restrictive house rules. In order to change the pattern of interactions with his parents, Simba leaves home. Leaving home will be difficult, because Simba was used to his role as a child in his parent’s home, even though he is not happy with that role. |
| Structuralism tells us that decisions of individuals are constrained by the broader structures of power and social control in society (Carniol, 1995, Marx, 1964). In this light, Simba’s decision to live on the streets is made under false restrictions on his choices. If society were more supportive of families and youth, Simba would be able to choose from a broader range of options and would not have to live on the streets. As a victim of repression and social deprivation, Simba may become frustrated and aggressive as a way of rebelling against society. |
| Humanism teaches us that people are unique individuals, whose choices do not necessarily fit into a theoretical pattern or model (Corey, 1996). Simba’s decision to leave home might not be explicable by other theoretical perspectives. It need not make sense according to anyone else’s reasoning or theories of decision making. |
Given this broad and colorful range of theoretical perspectives, you may be wondering why I have chosen to focus on rational decision making. You may see rational decision making as dry, restrictive and biased towards Western male ideology. And, I would not argue that you are wrong.
My decision to focus on rational decision making is based more on pragmatic reasons than philosophical ones. No one book or class can do justice to the range of theories identified above. Proficiency in any single model can take years of study and experience. Hopefully, you have studied or will study these perspectives in much greater depth in other courses. On the other hand, few educational programs for helping professionals require students to study Decision Tree Analysis and Game Theory. Using numbers and mathematical equations to deal with problems of human interaction may sound insensitive to helping professionals. However, please bear with me as I try to show how rational and non-rational models can be blended.
Rational decision-making theory is used extensively in many models of CR. These models encourage conflictants to make decisions consciously, based upon reasoned choices. In this sense, rational decision making is similar to cognitive therapy. This does not mean that a helping professional only uses rational decision-making theory. A practical understanding of other models will help you identify why conflictants are not making reasoned choices and how you can help them to move towards informed decision making. You can also identify the limitations of rational decision making and determine when other perspectives are more appropriate.
When teaching CR to interdisciplinary groups, I find that some professionals are more skilled in "process," whereas others are more skilled in "product." Psychologists, social workers and therapists tend to approach CR from a process orientation. They attend well to concerns such as emotions, relationships, communication, and underlying psychosocial issues. Lawyers and business administration people tend to approach CR from a product orientation. They are skilled at analyzing problems, setting clear objectives, and working towards concrete, reasoned solutions. CR requires a combination of process and product orientations. Each type of professional can learn from the other.
CR is not therapy – the differences will become more apparent as you work through various models of negotiation, mediation and advocacy. For now, consider whether CR can be distinguished based on the extent to which it focuses on rational decision making and problem solving (i.e., does therapy draw more from other theoretical bases). As you develop your own model of CR, also consider the extents to which you are process oriented and product oriented.
Problem Solving and Decision Tree Analysis
As Chapter 1 noted, most disciplines use some type of structured problem-solving process. A generic problem-solving model includes the following steps: identify problems, canvass a broad array of alternative courses of action, identify objectives and values to be taken into account, gather information relevant to the choices to be made, evaluate the alternatives, select the best alternative given the identified objectives and values, implement the decision, and evaluate its execution to identify any further problems (Zey, 1992). Decision Tree Analysis is basically an extension of this type of problem-solving process. Decision trees offer a specific structure for exploring alternative courses of action to resolve a conflict (Elangovan, 1995; Walls & Fullmer, 1995). They are commonly used in business and law to evaluate various courses of action: for example, is it better to go to court or negotiate a settlement privately; should the company invest in research and development or use its funds for marketing and promotion. Generally, these types of decisions are based on monetary factors. However, non-monetary factors such as emotions, values, communication, and relationships can also be factored into Decision Tree Analysis. For helping professionals, these "soft factors" are often more important than monetary ones.
Decision Tree Analysis follows six basic steps:
1. Depict the decisions to be made and possible outcomes for each decision.
2. Assign probabilities to each of the uncertain events.
3. Assign values to each of the possible outcomes.
4. Calculate the Expected Values for each possible alternative.
5. Identify soft factors that are relevant to the decisions to be made.
6. Decide upon the best alternative.
In order to demonstrate these steps, consider a situation where you are trying to decide whether to confront a client, Clifford, about paying his bill for your services. To simplify for the purposes of demonstration, consider two courses of action, ignoring the late payment or confronting Clifford the next time you see him for a counseling session.
In Step 1, depict the decision to be made and possible outcomes for each decision. To depict a decision, draw a small square with lines (or branches) extending to the right for each possible alternative. Label each alternative on this Decision Fork as follows:
The number 1 in the square denotes that this is Decision Fork 1.
Each decision or "alternative" is a potential course of action. The decision maker has control over these. In this case, you can decide whether to confront your client or ignore the issue of late payment. When you select an alternative, you do not know the specific outcome or solution. Possible outcomes or "options" for solution are dependent upon the other person's response to your decision. If you confront Clifford, he will either pay his bill or refuse to pay. To depict each of these possible outcomes, draw a small circle at the end of Decision Fork 1 and draw one branch for each possible outcome. Label each outcome as follows:
For Step 2, probabilities are assigned for each uncertain event. Probabilities for outcomes are often best estimates, rather than precise percentages. If you believe that there is a high likelihood of a particular outcome, then the percentage will be in the range of 70 to 100%. If you believe there is a moderate likelihood, then the percentage will be in the range of 40 to 70%. If you believe there is a low likelihood, then the percentage is in the range of 0 to 40%. You could also identify conservative and optimistic estimates in order to perform the calculations. To keep the illustration relatively simple, I will use just one set of reasonable estimates. Assuming you believe there is a 70% likelihood that Clifford will pay and a 30% chance that he will not pay, the decision tree looks as follows:
Note that the percentages for each Outcome Fork add up to 100%, indicating that all possible outcomes have been identified.
Step 3 requires one to insert Endpoint Values for each possible outcome. The Endpoint Value is the difference between the benefit and cost of each outcome (i.e., the net benefit). Assuming Clifford owes $500, then his paying is worth $500 and his refusing to pay is worth $0. If you incurred any costs in order to collect these amounts, then the costs would be subtracted. If the costs exceed the benefits, then the Endpoint Value will be negative.
Step 4 requires calculating the Expected Value for each Outcome Fork. The Expected Value is the weighted average of the End Values for each Outcome Fork. To calculate the Expected Value, multiply each probability with the End Value, and add the results together. In the sample case, the Expected Value of decision 1A (EV1A) is:
EV1A = (70% X $500) + (30% X $0) = $350
To complete the decision tree, insert the Outcome Fork, End Values and Expected Values for the second decision alternative, ignoring the issue of late payments. Assume that there is only a 20% chance that Clifford will pay what he owes if you do not confront him. The decision tree looks as follows:
Step 5 says to identify soft factors. For example, you might find it difficult to confront a client about money. Alternatively, you might believe that confronting Clifford at this time is inappropriate since Clifford is dealing with a crisis situation. If you are averse to taking risks, you might be particularly concerned about whether confronting Clifford about the money will put him over the edge. Once you label these concerns, the decision tree looks as follows:
I describe other soft factors, including moral sentiments about justice, in greater depth described below.
Step 6 concludes the analysis by determining which course of action is preferable, given the monetary and non-monetary concerns identified. When evaluating each decision alternative, the branch with the largest Expected Value represents the choice with the greatest economic benefit. Based on monetary concerns, confronting Clifford is preferable because the Expected Value for confronting ($350) is higher than the Expected Value for ignoring ($100). However, you also identified that Clifford is in a crisis. If you determine that helping Clifford through the crisis is more important than collecting fees owed by Clifford, then you will choose to ignore the late payments (at least for the present time).
This example begins to show how Decision Tree Analysis can help you make reasoned decisions about how to proceed in conflict situations. Many other alternatives could also be considered: write Clifford a letter; confront Clifford at a later date; refuse to provide services for Clifford; or help Clifford apply for financial support to pay for counseling.
You can also analyze a sequence of alternatives and possible outcomes. For instance, if you confront Clifford and he does not pay his bill, you need to decide what to do next: write a letter, confront him again, ignore the problem, etc. For each successive decision fork, the tree will expand to the right with further Outcome Forks.
When calculating Expected Values, begin with the Outcome Forks furthest to the right and work back towards the left ("folding back the tree"). In this example, the highest Expected Value for decision 2 is EV2A = $250. This suggests that you should write Clifford a letter if he does not respond to your initial request to pay you. The Expected Value for Decision 1A now becomes:
EV1A = (70% X $500) + (30% X $250) = $425
This amount is higher than in the first example, indicating that the best course of action financially is first to confront Clifford in person. If he does not pay his arrears, then follow up with a letter. You have increased your chances of collecting your fees by using a staged approach. Once again, soft factors need to be considered.
Some helping professionals are turned off by the use of mathematical equations to determine how they will intervene. Keep an open mind when you are working through the exercises in this book, since monetary factors are important for many types of decisions. For other kinds of conflict situations, the numbers and calculations are not essential. Even without the numbers, Decision Trees are useful because they:
clarify the decisions to be made,
help to brainstorm alternatives in a structured manner,
indicate the possible outcomes of alternate courses of action,
identify factors that are critical to decision making,
encourage the decision maker to consider rational factors as well as emotions, traditions, and moral sentiments,
provide visual representations to guide the decision-making process, enabling one to see both the broad picture and the finer points,
help one strategize and prepare for how to deal with a conflict, and
help two or more parties work through a conflict jointly.
The example with Clifford demonstrates how you can use decision trees to make your own decisions about how to respond to conflict. You can also use decision trees to help clients decide how to respond to their own conflict situations. For instance, in working with a battered woman, you can use a decision tree to help her explore her alternatives. Often, such clients are so used to a particular pattern of interaction that they do not see other available choices. The client may see her choices as leaving her spouse and home versus staying in an abusive relationship. If she leaves, then she gives up the security of her home and familiar surroundings. She may believe she has no place to go except for the streets or a hostel for battered women. If she stays, she continues to be abused. By helping her look at other alternatives, she broadens her choice set and becomes more empowered to make self-determined decisions (Dan-Cohen, 1992).
For an example of using decision trees for joint decision making, consider an interdisciplinary committee meeting where the participants are deciding how to regulate their professions. Ordinarily, each professional might submit a separate plan. This sets them up to have to decide whose plan is best. In a joint problem-solving exercise, the participants develop a decision tree together. Various alternatives are canvassed and evaluated without any individual owning a particular idea. The tree belongs to the whole group and the group comes up with a mutually acceptable course of action.
When analyzing a decision tree, one of the key questions is, "What do the decision makers want?" A common theme in conflict situations is that parties want "justice." Each party feels wronged by the other and wants a solution that is just. Definitions of justice vary from person to person and culture to culture. Some want retribution or punishment. Others want restitution, compensation, deterrence, healing, or protection (Umbreit, 1997b).
Retributive justice demands that people receive appropriate punishment for their misdeeds. Criminal courts focus on retributive justice. If someone commits murder, then the punishment (typically incarceration) must be commensurate with the crime. The Biblical adage, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," also suggests that punishment must be equivalent to the harm done. If, for example, Ingrid pokes out Dilbert’s eyes, then Ingrid deserves to have her eyes poked out. Vengeance is based on the concept of retribution. You hurt me, so I need to hurt you back. The archetypal blood feud between the Hatfield’s and McCoys seems irrational, until you factor in each side’s desire for revenge (Frank, 1992). After three decades of fighting, it hardly mattered what originally caused the feud. Each side was bent on retribution. After a series of atrocities are committed against one another, however, can there ever be justice?
Compensation and restitution are related concepts of justice. Under the notion of compensation, when one person incurs a loss caused by another, the person who caused the loss is expected to make up for the loss. Compensation could be a monetary payment or replacement of the loss "in kind." In Dilbert’s case, Ingrid could compensate him with money or by becoming his seeing eye aid. Restitution refers to putting the situation back to how it was prior to the loss. In the present example, this would require repairing Dilbert’s eyes to their original state. Exact restitution may not be possible, so a next best replacement may be necessary.
Ho’oponopono ("making right the wrong") is traditional conflict resolution method among Hawaiians that is partially based on the concept of restitution (Wall & Callister, 1995). It is also based on the notion of healing. Healing is emotional or spiritual process which enables the people to move on with their lives and relationships in a more positive fashion.
Whereas retribution, restitution and compensation focus on making up for past wrongs, deterrence and protection focus on the future. Under these latter notions of justice, people are concerned about preventing harm from reoccurring. How do we ensure that Ingrid does not poke out anyone’s eyes in the future (specific deterrence)? How do we ensure that no one pokes out anyone’s eyes in the future (general deterrence)? In order to deter people from committing similar offenses, society could punish Ingrid. This sets a precedent that tells others there will be harsh consequences if they commit a similar offense. The state could also incarcerate Ingrid to prevent her from recommitting. Alternatively, the state could try to rehabilitate Ingrid through therapeutic or healing processes.
Consider Clifford’s case again. If he is late on paying his bill, what do you really want – Retribution? Compensation? Restitution? Deterrence? Rehabilitation? Your decision about how to deal with this conflict depends on the type of justice you are seeking. The type of justice you choose depends, in turn, on your values and moral sentiments. There is no universally correct formula for justice.
When selecting between various models of conflict resolution, different models are better suited to definitions of justice. Mediation, for instance, is future focused, making it well-suited for rehabilitation of relationships. The public court system is better suited to assigning blame, imposing punishment for past misdeeds, and setting precedents for future cases.
Certainly, Decision Tree Analysis does have its drawbacks and limitations (Zey, 1992). First, decision trees and calculations become cumbersome in complex situations. If there are many choices and possible outcomes, you may need to simplify the facts in order to make the analysis manageable. This may not reflect the full reality of the situation. On the other hand, decision trees help decision makers cut through complex details and focus upon the most important issues. Computer software designed to illustrate decision trees and calculate Expected Values makes it easier to depict and synthesize complex situations (Walls & Fullmer, 1995).
The second criticism is that Decision Tree Analysis (and all reasoned choice models) assume that the decision makers have perfect information. In most social conflict situations, the decision makers do not know all of the possible alternatives or all of the possible options for solution. Probabilities of various outcomes are particularly difficult to predict. Decision trees help decision makers identify gaps in information. To the extent that they can fill in gaps, the quality of the choices improves. Still, decision makers must acknowledge lack of perfect information, limitations of subjective factors, and possibilities of error. Conflict resolution and decision making are not exact sciences.
The third criticism is that Decision Tree Analysis suggests that rational choices are preferable to ones based on emotional, moral or other criteria. The terminology implies that someone who is not rational is "irrational" or "crazy." To avoid this connotation, the converse of rational could be termed "non-rational." Non-rational choices can be perfectly valid choices. Whether Decision Tree Analysis actually has a bias towards rational choices depends upon how one employs it. The examples above demonstrate how soft factors can be considered in making decisions. Decisions need not be based solely on monetary factors or economic efficiency. The focus of Decision Tree Analysis is "informed choice" rather than "rational choice." In order to respect a client’s right to self-determination, a practitioner must respect the client’s ultimate decision – even if it goes against what the practitioner believes is a rational choice. However, the practitioner does have a role in helping the client to explore a range of alternatives and options so the client can make an informed choice. As with any model of practice, helping professionals must be careful not to impose personal values on clients.
The fourth criticism is that there is no formula for how to take soft factors into account. Soft factors could be quantified; for example, how much is revenge worth to you? Would you be willing to engage in a fight, knowing it would cost you $10,000, as long as it satisfied your yen for vengeance. Quantification of soft factors is not easy or required. Even if there is a subjective element to considering soft factors, it is better to identify them rather than leave them out of the analysis altogether. Once monetary and soft factors are identified, decision makers are in a better position to make informed decisions about their priorities.
In spite of their limitations, decision trees can assist with various types of CR. Trees are a tool which can be used in combination with other tools and strategies. No one tool is perfect for all types of situations nor as an exclusive strategy for CR.
Game Theory
Game Theory provides methods of modeling conflict and analyzing decision making processes. Game Theory is essentially a systems theory, since it looks at the patterns of behavior between interdependent individuals or groups (Nicoterra, 1995; Yilmaz, 1997). It has been used extensively in political science, mathematics, business administration, strategic studies, economics, and mathematics.
Ironically, Game Theory has received little attention within the helping professions, even among those which draw heavily from systems theories. Two reasons might explain. First, much of Game Theory is based upon rationally conducted conflict; i.e., using objective reasoning to analyze how people will respond in a particular situation. As with Decision Tree Analysis, emotional factors can be taken into account, but most of the literature emphasizes rational factors. Second, there is a gap between the literature on conflict analysis and conflict resolution practice. Most often, Game Theory literature focuses on how to analyze conflict. It does not describe how practitioners can put this knowledge into practice. In other words, how do practitioners use Game Theory to help them design and implement interventions. On the converse side of the equation, many CR training courses and materials identify strategies for CR practice without explaining their theoretical basis. In this section, I hope to bridge the gap between Game Theory and conflict resolution practice.
Game Theory devises models of analyzing conflict where there are defined interests, specific choices, and a sequence of moves by the players. The models can be used to predict what people will do and what outcomes will result (Nicoterra, 1995; Rapport, 1960). These models can be tested empirically. When models are proven valid, they become useful tools for strategizing how to respond effectively in conflict situations.
Consider a simple game such as "tic-tac-toe." There are two players, X and O. Each one is interested in winning. They alternate taking turns, placing their respective letter in one of nine squares.
Insert a tic-tac-toe box, with an X in one corner
The winner is the first one who is able to connect a string of three consecutive Xs or three consecutive Os in a row, diagonal or column. For each move, the player has a limited number of choices. A player can play offensively, by trying to develop a string of letters, or defensively, by trying to block the other player from completing a string. Once one knows the parameters of the game, one can analyze what each player will do in a particular situation and determine where to put one’s letter in order to have the best chance of winning the game. If both players know the game well, then the game will always result in a draw (no winner). This is an example of a competitive game, where both players have mutually exclusive interests. There can only be one winner, and frequently there are no winners.
Ordinarily, neither tic-tac-toe player has an interest in helping the other player. However, note the example of a parent teaching a child how to play the game. The parent’s interest is not to win against the child, but to help the child learn the game and have fun. Accordingly, the parent may let the child win the game in order to let the child have the satisfaction of winning.
When people think of games, they often think only of competitive games – for example chess, poker, figure skating, and computer war games. However, game theory also engenders cooperative games. Playing catch with a frisbee or skipping rope are examples. "Winning" in cooperative games is based upon working together. While playing catch, one throws the frisbee towards one’s partner, not away. In skipping rope, the people holding the rope try to help the skippers skip, not trip them. The relationship and mutual success are more important than individual success.
Now, what does any of this have to do with helping professionals? Game Theory can be applied in real social conflict situations, not just games for play. By looking at the alternative courses of action of various players involved in a conflict, one can analyze: (a) what course of action is beneficial for both, (b) the likely result of a conflict without further intervention, and (c) how to improve upon the results with an appropriate intervention.
One method of analyzing games is to set up a matrix box, according to the following seven steps:
To illustrate, consider a situation in a school where two students are suspected of setting a fire in the gymnasium. This example is based on one of the most classic cases in Game Theory, "Prisoners’ Dilemma" (Rappoport, 1960). If the teacher or school counselor meets with each student separately, the students have two alternatives, confess to setting the fire or remain silent. These decisions can be represented in a matrix which illustrates the decision choices of both students (or players):
| Player B | ||||||
| Remains silent | Confesses | |||||
| Player A | ||||||
| Remains silent: | ||||||
| Confesses: |
Given that each player has two alternatives, there are four different possible outcomes: (1) both confess; (2) both remain silent; (3) A remains silent but B confesses; (4) B confesses but A remains silent. Suppose that the students know the teacher will punish students who set fires and will punish even more severely students who set fires and do not admit it when confronted. The teacher has created incentives which pit one student against the other, in hopes that one or both students will confess to setting the fire.
The possible gains or losses for each student can be represented with the following numbers:
+2 Maximum gain = No punishment, commended for being honest
+1 Minimum gain = No punishment
-1 Minimum loss = Lenient punishment (detention after classes)
-2 Maximum loss = Severe punishment (suspension from school)
Inserting these possibilities into the matrix, the students incur different outcomes depending not only on their individual decisions, but also on the decisions of the other student.
| Player B | ||||||
| Remains silent | Confesses | |||||
| (cooperative) | (competitive/defects) | |||||
| Player A | ||||||
| Remains silent: | A= +1; B= +1 | A= -2; B= +2 | ||||
| Confesses: | A= +2; B= -2 | A= -1; B= -1 |
Starting with the top left quadrant and moving in a clockwise fashion, the possible outcomes are as follows:
| If both remain silent, then neither will be punished nor commended (+1, a minimal gain for both). |
| If A remains silent and B confesses, then A will be severely punished for setting the fire and B will be commended for being honest (-2, a maximum loss for A; +2, a maximum gain for B). |
| If both confess, then both will receive detention for setting the fire. Neither will be suspended, because both were honest when confronted (-1, minor punishment for both). |
| If A confesses and B remains silent, then A will be commended for being honest and be will be severely punished for setting the fire (+2, a maximum gain for A; -2, a maximum loss for B). |
If each student is competitive (i.e., self-interested), the best combination is to confess while the other student remains silent. In other words, exploit the other student. If both students confess, however, they will both receive partial punishment. Accordingly, the desire to be competitive will result in partial losses for both. Both can achieve a partial gain if they both remain silent. This is the cooperative solution. The problem for each student is that by remaining silent, they set themselves up for the possibility that the other student will confess.
Research on Prisoners’ Dilemma situations shows that 60 to 80 % of players choose to be competitive. The players know that they can both benefit if both cooperate. However, they do not know if they can trust the other player (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).
As a helping professional, your role is not to set up one student against the other. Your interest is to encourage both students to be honest. Accordingly, consider creating a different set of dynamics that will encourage this type of behavior. For example, instead of meeting with each student separately, allow the students to meet with each other before meeting with them. This allows them to develop trust and collaborate with one another. With the current set of rewards and punishments, they will be encouraged to both remain silent. However, if you restructure the incentives to favor honesty, you can encourage both to come forward and take responsibility for setting the fire. Rather than punish the students with detention or suspension, allow the students to offer a means to make up for setting the fire.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma situation leads to a deadlock between the parties. The lesson for intervenors is that they can move conflicting parties out of a deadlock by increasing their certainty in achieving a cooperative solution (Levy, 1985). This suggests that the CR practitioner’s roles are: (1) to build trust between the parties, (2) increase their awareness of the consequences of not cooperating, and (3) help them identify ways of achieving a cooperative solution.
In the typical Prisoners’ Dilemma, the parties play simultaneously; e.g., both players have to decide whether to confess or stay silent without having the opportunity to see how the other will act. If an intervenor changes the rules to allow them to play sequentially, then they can build trust. The first player can take a small risk, to see if the second player responds in kind. As each player learns to trust the other, they can start taking larger and larger risks. This turns negotiation into a series of games, rather than a single game. The process is incremental rather than "all or nothing."
Game Theory demonstrates that people are more likely to cooperate in an ongoing series of games, rather than a single or finite series. People are less likely to endure the pain of competition if they know it will to be ongoing. People involved in feuds, wars or other battles often assume that the conflict will be over quickly. CR professionals can highlight the potential for the conflict to become protracted.
You may be wondering why Prisoners’ Dilemma situations are so difficult when it seems "so obvious" that cooperation is the best solution. Mistrust, greed, and emotional hurt often make cooperation difficult. However, the benefits of cooperation may not be so obvious. The parties may lack information about the costs of competition or the benefits of cooperation. There may also be secondary payoffs from competition. For example, if one party wants revenge against the other, then pursuing the competitive alternative will seem desirable even if there are large costs involved.
Two other common games are "Chicken" and "Resource Dilemmas" (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In the classic form of Chicken, two drivers race their cars towards one another. The first one to swerve away from the other car is a chicken (the "loser"). If neither person swerves away, then both lose. Neither is declared a chicken, but both will suffer from the ensuing collision (perhaps resulting in their deaths). For each player, the best solution is for the other to swerve away first.
| Driver B | ||||||
| Swerves | Refuses to Swerve | |||||
| (cooperative) | (competitive/defects) | |||||
| Driver A | ||||||
| Swerves: | Both live | Both live | ||||
| Both chicken | A is chicken | |||||
| Refuses to: | Both live | Both die | ||||
| swerve | B is Chicken | Neither is Chicken |
When one analyzes the game of chicken, each player has a mixed motive: "I want to live but I don’t want to be a chicken." There is no way for the players to cooperate where they will both win. What is the rationale decision for each player? Do not play the game.
Although the decision to refuse to play the game seems obvious, people often engage in games of Chicken (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In collective bargaining, for instance, a labor union threatens to strike and management threatens to lock labor out. In international relations, one country threatens to use chemical weapons and the other threatens a preemptive attack. In legal disputes, both parties threaten to take the other to court. In gang violence, one group pulls out its switchblades and the other feels obliged to take up the challenge. In a family dispute, a child threatens to leave and the parents threaten to throw the child out. In each case, neither player wants to back down and look weak. If neither player backs down, the results are disastrous for both.
By recognizing games of Chicken, helping professionals can help players work through the possible outcomes without having to incur the actual losses. As a family mediator, I know that very few parents who go to court to fight for child custody come away satisfied. Even if they agree with the judge’s decision, they still come away dissatisfied with the financial costs, time and aggravation of the adversarial process. Parents in the initial stages of a custody dispute may not be aware of the costs of playing chicken. Sure it is difficult to back down. Both parents want to demonstrate that they will do whatever they can to secure the custody of the child they love so much. Neither wants to lose face by backing down. As a helping professional, how can I help one or both parents save face? How can I help them see that there are better alternatives to playing chicken? I describe some of the strategies for intervention in the next three chapters. However, the theoretical basis for these strategies comes from Game Theory.
"Resource Dilemmas" are based upon how to distribute limited resources between the players (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). For example, how does an agency determine how much to pay its workers with university degrees versus workers without university degrees. The agency has a limited budget. If degreed workers are paid more, then non-degreed workers will have to be paid less. This is an example of a zero-sum game. Assuming a budget of $200,000, one possible division would be $100,000 to each group of workers. If the agency determined to give the degreed workers, $50,000 more, then it would have to reduce the payments to non-degreed workers by $50,000. The sum of the increase to one group and decrease to the other group equals zero.
In a zero-sum game, the question is how to divide the pie in a way that is fair to all players. In some situations, fairness depends upon equal treatment (e.g., equal pay for all workers). Other criteria could also be considered. Pay workers based on the value of the work, their level of experience, their level of education, or their need for funds. Who should receive higher pay: a competent psychologist with a Ph.D., but no dependent children; or a competent non-degreed human service worker with two dependent children? Ultimately, the agency needs to determine criteria for salaries based on its own set of values. The pool of resources remains constant.
Not all Resource Dilemmas are zero-sum games. A non-constant sum game is one in which the players can increase the overall value of their resources depending upon the way resources are allocated. For example, an agency’s resources are not limited to its funds for salaries. The agency can also provide professional development. If the non-degreed workers value professional development, they may agree to lower salaries than the degreed workers in return for professional development seminars. The degreed workers may agree to provide professional development in return for greater pay. This is an example of a win-win solution. Both sides have something to gain by cooperating. The question is not how to divide a fixed pie, but how to increase the size of the pie.
People embroiled in conflict often view their situation as if it were a zero-sum game. "In order for me to do better, you have to do worse." Helping professionals can assist conflicting parties by coming up with alternatives that turn zero-sum games into non-constant sum games. In other words, how can the players cooperate in order to produce a result which is better for everyone involved?
One of the most popular CR strategies suggests that you focus the parties on enlarging the pie – creating value or finding win-win situations (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991). In this light, cooperation is advantageous to everyone involved. Even though the pie is enlarged, the parties may still need to face the problem of how to divide it – claiming value (Lax & Sebenius, 1985). Allocation of resources can be based upon a number of principles, including distributive equity (fairness), economic efficiency, or other values ascribed to by the parties.
The previous example of a Resource Dilemma shows how this model applies to a problem of dividing resources from a common pool. A similar approach can be used to analyze conflicts between individuals who are contributing resources to a common cause (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Consider, for instance, a community which develops a "street watch" program. The community decides to patrol the neighborhood at night in order to protect individuals and property from criminal activities (mugging, vandalism, etc.). If all members of the community contribute to the program, then the program will succeed and all will benefit. If one member of the community refuses to cooperate, that person will still benefit from the program without having to contribute to it. If too many people defect from the program, then the program will fail. The question for community development workers becomes how to design the program in a way that everyone will want to contribute their "fair share."
Some games result in a definitive equilibrium. An equilibrium occurs when both players have a preferred, stable strategy. In other words, each player has a singular, best strategy, regardless of how the other person behaves. For example, each may decide that it is best to cooperate, regardless of what the other does. In other cases there is disequilibrium. Neither player trusts the other, so they do not know whether to cooperate or compete. When there is a disequilibrium, the parties are in flux. There is no single, best strategy for either party.
Paradoxically, deciding to cooperate puts each party at risk. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, for example, both students could agree to keep quiet. If one student reneges on this agreement, then the other takes the fall for both students. The student who takes the fall is actually worse off than if there were no original agreement to cooperate. Once again, helping professionals can help to construct arrangements that create incentives to cooperate and produce a positive equilibrium.
An equilibrium is not necessarily a positive outcome. If, for instance, the preferred strategy for each party is to fight, both may be endangered. How could this be a preferred strategy if both parties are endangered? Refusing to fight may be even more endangering. To illustrate, consider person, Peter, who is being abused. If Peter does not fight back, the abuse will continue. If Peter does fight back, the abuse may still continue. If the abuse is worse in the latter case, then Peter is better off not fighting back. This is Peter’s equilibrium, even though the result is negative. As noted earlier, the role of a helping professional may be to help the person suffering abuse to see alternative ways of responding (i.e., to help them move out of the negative equilibrium that has developed).
One strategy for upsetting an equilibrium is to alter the relative power balance between the parties. I describe redistribution of power in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6. However, I am providing one example here to demonstrate the connection to Game Theory. Consider how Peter might be able to deter his spouse from being abusive. Deterrence generally works only when the defending party has more power than the potential attacker (Sorokin, 1994). In an abusive relationship, the abusive spouse has the greater power. In order to upset the current equilibrium, Peter can establish coalitions with friends or other support systems (e.g., helping professionals, relatives, the justice system). With the aid of their resources and emotional support, Peter gains new power and can deter his abusive spouse. Accordingly, a new equilibrium is established where the abuse stops.
Games can also be analyzed by using the concepts of individual preferences and utilities. These concepts, drawn from economic theory, suggest that different people place different values on specific resources. (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Yilmaz, 1997). Consider, for instance, how to divide four apples and four oranges between two people. An equal division may be to give each person two apples and two oranges. If one person prefers oranges to apples, then that person would be better off with four oranges. Perhaps our orange lover really just needs three oranges. The fourth will go bad before it can be used. Accordingly, the orange lover may want at least one apple. By knowing each player’s preferences, one can determine how to maximize their satisfaction. If both players can do better with a different distribution, then once again, there is a win-win situation. For helping professionals, one of the key lessons of this type of analysis is that conflicting parties can often do better by cooperating than by competing.
Cooperation, however, is not always the best course of action for both parties. If one party is able to impose its will on the other, then what is the more powerful party’s incentive to cooperate? In these cases, helping professionals need to draw upon non-rational factors to help people reach collaborative solutions (e.g., encourage parties to value fairness, nonviolence, and cooperation). Helping professionals may also be able to reconstruct incentives in the systems in order to make cooperation more desirable.
This section just scratches the surface of Game Theory. Empirical research and computer-assisted simulations have been used to explore a broad range of social conflicts. Some of the analysis requires in-depth understandings of economics, mathematics, and strategic studies. Helping professionals can draw from many aspects of Game Theory, whether or not they have backgrounds in these disciplines. Just as important, helping professionals have much to contribute to this field.
As with Decision Tree Analysis, Game Theory is not without criticism. A primary concern is the nature of the assumptions made in Game Theory. Various models used in this approach are dependent upon certain assumptions in order to simplify the analysis. Otherwise, the range of factors become unmanageable. Some of the more common assumptions in Game Theory analyses are:
|
|
Players are acting out of self-interest. |
| Players are acting with full information. |
| Players make choices in a predictable order. |
| Players have a limited number of alternatives to choose between (Nicoterra, 1995). |
In situations where these assumptions are invalid, the analysis must be altered. For example, players involved in intimate relationships are likely to behave quite differently from players who are complete strangers. Loving partners are more likely to accommodate one another, rather than compete. Even strangers may not act solely out of self-interest. Individual personalities, values and culture must be factored into the analysis.
The assumption about information is particularly problematic in conflict situations. Parties may withhold information or present misinformation to one another in order to gain a competitive advantage. Even if both parties are open and honest, access to information is not assured. One or both parties may lack knowledge about the nature of the conflict, possible alternatives and the outcomes of each. Under stress from conflict, their ability to access information may also be impaired.
As noted earlier, the sequence of choice-making has a significant impact on the results of the game. If both players have to make a decision at the same time, then they are less likely to choose cooperative alternatives. Trust is something that develops through communication. People are more likely to cooperate if they make their choices sequentially and have an opportunity to communicate with one another before making choices. This also allows them to break down the conflict into smaller issues. If they have success with the first issues, then they will build trust in one another allowing them to tackle the other issues in spirit of cooperation.
Game Theory models generally consider only the most probable choices that the players might make. This simplifies the analysis, but reduces the range of choices of the parties. Paradoxically, considering a broad range of choices is more likely to produce an effective resolution. To avoid this problem, it may be useful to brainstorm a broad range of choices and analyze the conflict using different groupings of alternatives (e.g., consider two or three alternatives at a time, to see how the game will be played out).
While these criticisms demonstrate the limitations of Game Theory, Game Theory continues to be a popular method of conflict analysis. The following chapters illustrate how Game Theory – and other theories of decision making – can be translated into models of conflict resolution intervention.
Key Points
Decision making theory provides a theoretical bases for various models of CR.
CR professionals can apply various theories of decision making in order to assess conflicts and determine appropriate interventions (rather than simply fit each client into the same model of CR).
Non-rational decision-making theories include personality theories, drive theories, developmental theories, social construction, behaviorism, systems theories, structuralism, and humanism.
Rational decision-making theories assume that people make reasoned, self-interested choices. However, soft factors such as emotions, values and culture can be factored into Decision Tree Analysis and Game Theory.
Decision Tree Analysis is a tool for structured problem-solving that helps people involved in conflict explore various alternatives and the possible outcomes from different choices.
Helping professionals can use decision trees to make individual decisions about how to respond to conflict or to help conflicting parties work through joint problem-solving processes.
People involved in conflicts often want "justice," but justice has different meanings for different individuals and groups: retribution, punishment, restitution, compensation, deterrence, healing, or protection. Different CR models are based upon different concepts of justice.
Game Theory is a systems theory that frames conflicts as a game between two or more players: each player has a series of choices to make; the outcome of the game depends upon the combination of choices made by the parties.
Helping professionals can use Game Theory to analyze conflicts, to develop strategies for games involving themselves, and to help clients play games more effectively (or play different games altogether).
Prisoners’ Dilemma games suggest that the roles of CR professionals include building trust between the players, increasing their awareness of the consequences of not cooperating, and helping them identify ways of achieving a cooperative solution.
Games of Chicken suggest that the roles of CR professionals include helping players identify the costs of playing Chicken, save face in backing down from a conflict, and develop more constructive games to play.
Resource Dilemma games suggest that the roles of CR professionals include helping players work together, enlarge the pool of resources available to them, identify criteria for division of resources, and develop solutions that are mutually beneficial.
CR professionals need to be aware
of the limitations of various decision-making models, including the
assumptions they make about human behaviors, drives, and values.
Class Exercises and Discussion Questions
THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING: Identify a social or psychological theory commonly used within your profession. What are the basic tenets of this theory? How does this theory view the way in which people make decisions? What type of interventions does this theory suggest in order to influence the way a person or group makes a decision? What lessons can you derive from this theory in relation to conflict resolution?
MENTAL ILLNESS AND RATIONAL DECISIONS: You are working with a patient, Pat, who has a mental illness. Due to this condition, Pat suffers from paranoia. Pat wants to leave the hospital, believing that the hospital staff are trying to poison him. You believe that Pat is safer in the hospital than on his own. How could you use rational decision theories to work with Pat? What is your role if Pat wants to make an "irrational" decision? (cf., Barsky, 1997c; Corey, Corey, & Callahan, 1993; Loewenberg & Dolgoff , 1996)
EQUILIBRIUM: Select a model of family systems theory from the literature. How does it define the term "equilibrium." Does it mean the same thing in Game Theory as it does in family systems theory? If not, what are the similarities and differences?
RATIONAL AND COGNITIVE: Compare and contrast rational decision making theory with cognitive theory.
VALUES AND JUSTICE: Refer back to the list of values you identified in Chapter 2, Exercise 3. What do these values tell you about your sense of justice? Which of the following forms of justice fit best with your values and priorities: retribution, punishment, restitution, compensation, protection, healing, rehabilitation. Which forms of justice fit best with the methods of intervention favored by your profession?
Decision Tree Exercises
The following exercises are designed to offer you practice in developing decision trees. Add additional information, as needed, in order to come up with a thorough analysis. Do not question the facts given. They have been simplified for the purposes of these exercises and are not necessarily intended to reflect "real life" costs and risks involved. Also, remember that the other person’s information may be different from yours. If you decide to use decision trees for exercises in other chapters, you will have to identify the various alternatives, costs, benefits and chances of different outcomes. The case facts will only give you partial information and you will have to build the rest of the information. Just like real life. You will have lots of opportunities for creativity!
DECISION TREE EXERCISE 1: "Playing the Lottery"
You are trying to make a decision about whether to play the lottery. You have a one in a million chance of winning the grand prize of $2,000,000 if you buy a ticket for $10. Assume there are no other prizes. Draw a decision tree to reflect your choices. Calculate the Expected Value for each choice. Would a rational person play the lottery? Would you? What soft factors might explain why people play the lottery?
DECISION TREE EXERCISE 2: "Asking for a Raise"
You have been working for Diversity Plus for the past five years and currently earn an income of $40,000 per year. One year has passed since your last pay raise, so you are considering what your choices are. Being a very rational person you would like to follow a rational process to base your decision about what course of action to take. In order to carry out this process, you have gathered the following facts.
Initially, you seem to have four choices: ask your boss for a raise; go directly to the owner for a raise; look for another job; accept the status quo (do nothing). If you ask your boss for a raise, you believe that there is a 20% chance you will get a raise of $5,000, a 30% chance of getting a raise of $3,000, a 40% chance of getting no raise, and a 10% chance of getting fired. If you go directly to the owner for a raise, then there is a 50% chance that he will offer a $3,000 raise, but a 50% chance that he will refer you back to your boss. If the boss hears that you went to the owner, there will be a 10% chance you will get a raise of $8,000 (to avoid your going to the owner again), a 20% chance of getting a raise of $3,000 (to be fair), a 50% chance of getting no raise (because that’s what the owner really wants), and a 20% chance of getting fired (because of anger that you went above the boss’s head). If you get fired, you believe that you can get unemployment insurance benefits or part time work, but it will cost you $7,500 in the next year before you can get another job at a comparable salary. You feel that the prospects of getting another job in less than one year at a comparable salary (given your specific job skills and the recession in the job market) are worse than your chances of winning the lottery. Also, if you start to look for a job and the boss finds out, the boss may make life miserable for you (without actually firing or disciplining you).
If you get fired, you also have a number of options. You could go to a lawyer and sue for wrongful dismissal. The lawyer’s fees would be $5,000 if you negotiate a settlement, or $10,000 if the case goes to trial. If you settle, then there is a 50% chance of getting $15,000, a 40% chance of getting $10,000, and a 10% chance of getting $20,000. If you go to trial, there is a 60% chance of getting $20,000 and a 40% chance of getting nothing.
Create a decision tree to help you analyze this information, and help you to decide which options to take. Be sure to consider soft factors such as emotional energy, pride, risk aversion, and justice.
DECISION TREE EXERCISE 3: "Spousal Support"
Wanda and Harold have recently separated, following a ten-year marriage. Neither one has children. The main issue is spousal support. Harold currently earns $20,000 per year and believes that Wanda earns $60,000 per year. Wanda has been paying Harold $500 per month, but there is no formal separation agreement or court order. Harold has though about going back to school to earn a professional degree in order to become financially independent from Wanda after he completes the degree (in about 3 years). If he goes back to school, he believes he would need $4,000 per month to maintain his standard of living and to pay the costs of school. If he does not go back to school, he will need $11,500 per month support in addition to his regular income. He feels that he "deserves" more than this since Wanda’s income is likely to rise significantly over the next few years.
If Harold wants to go back to school, he has the following choices:
If Harold decides that it is not worth going back to school, he will have the following choices:
Harold may also want to consider other possibilities (e.g., getting remarried, having children; moving to a less expensive city) and how these might affect his current decisions. Assume that Harold is your client. Develop a decision tree which can be used to help him analyze this information and decide which options to take. After you have dealt with the monetary factors, remember to consider soft factors such as emotional energy, pride, justice, and propensity to take risks.
If one decision tree becomes too complicated, you may want to draw separate trees for separate decisions.
DECISION TREE EXERCISE 3: "Olympics Community"
Conflictia has just been awarded the right to hold the Olympic Games five years from now. The Mayor, the applicants, and
local business leaders are thrilled. Advocates for homeless and poverty-stricken groups living in the proposed Olympic site (including Victorious Park) are concerned. What will the impact of the Olympics be for them? A group of advocates gets together to consider their options:
The first option is to do nothing. Let the planning go ahead and put their faith in the Olympic Planning Committee (OPC) to come up with a plan that will look after their rights. The best scenario that could expected under this plan would for the OPC to demolish low-cost housing in Victorious Park, but use profits from The Olympics to subsidize cooperatives and public housing in other parts of the city. At worst, residents would be forced out of Victorious Park with no compensation and no support to find alternative housing. If the advocates do nothing now, they could still consider a public demonstrations or a court injunction at a later time.
The second option is to advocate with the World Olympic Committee to revoke Conflictia’s right to hold the Games. There is only minimal chance that this would happen, but think of the repercussions for the advocates and for the people of Victorious Park. The most likely consequence is that the World Olympic Committee will ignore the advocates, saying it is a done deal. The World Olympic Committee might put pressure on the OPC to provide support for residents who will be pushed out of Victorious Park, but the results are uncertain. Should the advocates take this route out of principle, even though "successful advocacy" is unlikely?
The third option is to try to collaborate with OPC; e.g., offer expertise and support, suggest that OPC offer local residents the first right to certain types of jobs at the Olympics, provide plans for "transitional improvements" to Victorious Park, rather than leveling the community in one broad sweep. Consider, what can the advocates do to try to raise their clout with the OPC, and influence their decisions in a favorable way.
Develop a decision tree to depict the various alternatives and outcomes. What are the best courses of action for the advocates? What criteria are you using in order to determine which alternatives are best?
Game Theory Exercises
Analyze the following two situations using a matrix box and the seven-step Game Theory method described in this chapter.
GAME THEORY EXERCISE 1: "Probation Collusion"
Adrian is an addictions counselor who is working with Ike, an involuntary client. Ike’s probation officer (P.O. Whaley) referred him to Adrian, even though Ike does not believe he has a problem with drugs or alcohol. During Ike’s first session with Adrian, Ike made it clear that he did not want any help. Adrian said, "Look, if you don’t want to be here, then I don’t want you here either. Let’s make a deal. You don’t come here unless you change your mind and decide we have something to talk about. If Whaley asks, I’ll tell him that you’re cooperating. You just have to say that I’ve been helping you." Ike agrees.
Four weeks later, P.O. Whaley starts asking questions. He wants to know how Ike is doing, in order to decide whether his conditions of probation have been satisfied. The probation officer talks to Ike and then to Adrian. Ike and Adrian have no contact with one another in between these discussions. Consider the consequences to Ike and Adrian if P.O. Whaley finds out how they have colluded.
GAME THEORY EXERCISE 2: "Striking Out"
You are working for an agency which has a union. The previous collective agreement has expired. Negotiations between management and labor have come down to one issue: the salary scale. The union is asking for an 8% increase in salaries. Management is offering 2%. Consider two alternatives for each side, holding firm and compromising.
If both hold firm, the union will go on strike. Over the course of the next year, this will cost employees an average of $5,000 each. The strike will cost the agency $200,000 (due to lost clients, cost of replacement workers, etc.).
If the union holds firm and management compromises, employees will gain an average of $2,000. The extra cost to the agency will be $50,000.
If the union compromises and management holds firm, the employees will gain $1,000. The extra cost to the agency will be $25,000.
If both the union and the agency compromise, the employees will gain $1,500. The extra cost to the agency will be $37,500.
GAME THEORY EXERCISE 3: "Mutual Interests of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice"
A Pro-Life group believes that a fetus is a human being. As such, the fetus has a right to life that supercedes any right the mother might have to decide to have an abortion. A Pro-Choice group believes that the mother’s right to control her body supercedes any right to life of the fetus. This gives the mother the right to decide whether to have an abortion, at least during the first trimester of a pregnancy. The current laws reflect the views of Pro-Choice.
Both Pro-Life and Pro-Choice have strong organizations, with infrastructures for fundraising and membership building. Pro-Choice has a slightly larger budget and membership than Pro-Life. An election is coming up and both groups want to put their messages on the political agenda. Pro-Choice begins a public promotion that attacks the views of Pro-Life. Pro-Life responds with its own public promotion to counter the promotion of Pro-Choice. Verbal attacks are hurled by one side against the other, each claiming the other side is immoral. A year ago, extremists affiliated with Pro-Life bombed a clinic where abortions were performed. Extremists within Pro-Choice responded with death threats to members of Pro-Life. Both groups have had to hire security guards.
In the midst of the election campaign, a new group emerges, Pro-Green. Pro-Green has nothing to do with the Pro-Choice/Pro-Life debate. The mandate of Pro-Green is to make people aware of environmental issues and to provide government with information about sensitive environmental areas. Pro-Green’s budget and membership is much smaller than that of Pro-Life or Pro-Choice.
Using principles from Game Theory, consider which of the three groups is most likely to be successful in getting its issues on the political agenda. Remember, Pro-Choice and Pro-Life have the greatest number of resources, supporters, and power.
Role Play 3.1: "Joint Decision Tree – Casey’s Case"
This role play is designed to provide you with experience facilitating a joint problem-solving process using a decision tree. Three role players are needed: Edwina (an education counselor), Parker, and Pamela (parents or a five-year old named Casey). Pamela and Parker are meeting with Edwina to discuss Casey’s education. Casey has a mild cognitive impairment. Parker wants Casey to be enrolled in the special education program at Conflictia Elementary School. Pamela wants Casey to be placed in the mainstream program at Conflictia Elementary.
Parker believes that the teachers are better in the special education program. He does not want to see Casey fall behind. He believes that good education during a child’s formative years is particularly important. Parker is also concerned that Casey will be teased by other students in the mainstream program. Casey is somewhat shy and withdrawn, so he might benefit from smaller classes in the special education stream.
Pamela is concerned that Casey’s future will be limited from the outset if put in a special program. She fears that Casey will not have the same career opportunities and that Casey will not learn how to socialize with "normal" people. She is also concerned that some children in the special education program have behavioral problems and more severe challenges than Casey.
Edwina does not have a strong opinion about whether Casey should be placed in one program or the other. She sees her role as getting the parents to agree to one plan, and support Casey, regardless of the decision. During the role play, Edwina will try to engage Pamela and Parker in a joint decision making process and move them away from a debate against one another. In order to facilitate this process, consider the following steps:
This role play will take 20 to 30 minutes.
DEBRIEFING: What strategies did Edwina use that helped Pamela and Parker move towards joint decision making? If it was difficult for Pamela and Parker to work together, what factors contributed to these difficulties? What, if anything, did Pamela and Parker learn from building the decision tree? How did the decision tree help (or hinder) the decision-making process?
How should Edwina decide whether or not to bring Casey into the decision-making process? If she does bring Casey in, how should this be done?
Role Play 3.2: "Penelope’s AIDS Decisions"
This role play has two roles, Penelope (a person with AIDS) and Ahmad (an AIDS counselor). Assign one role to each person. Read the "Common Facts" plus the "Confidential Facts" for your own role. Not knowing the other person’s Confidential Facts will help simulate real life situations, where the counselor and client enter a situation with different information and perspectives. The role play will take 50 to 70 minutes, with breaks in the middle for feedback and debriefing.
COMMON FACTS:
Penelope is a 35 year old woman who has recently been diagnosed with AIDS. She did not believe she was in a high risk group for contracting HIV, but was tested after coming down with a type of pneumonia associated with AIDS. At first, she thought her test results must wrong. On a second test by another clinic, the first results were confirmed. Penelope became depressed and started to isolate herself from friends, work, and family.
A clinic at Conflictia Hope for People with AIDS (PWAs) made a number of attempts at outreach with Penelope. Eventually, one of the counselors (Ahmad) connected with Penelope and began to see her on a weekly basis. Initially, Penelope and Ahmad just talked about how Penelope was coping emotionally. Ahmad's role was to listen, to demonstrate empathic understanding, to develop trust, and to screen for homicidal ideation (thoughts).
Penelope has begun to come out of her depression and is starting to make plans for the future. In the session to be role played, Penelope and Ahmad will discuss whether Penelope will tell her boss that she has AIDS. Penelope is a waiter in a posh restaurant. Her boss, Benita, only knows that Penelope has been taking sick leave. Benita does not know the nature of her illness.
Penelope is very embarrassed about having AIDS. She sees it as an illness that only gays and drug addicts get. She is worried that if she tells anyone at work, she will lose her job. If she does not tell and Benita finds out, she may also lose her job. Penelope is also concerned that co-workers will stigmatize her at work, even if she does not lose her job.
PENELOPE’S CONFIDENTIAL FACTS:
In order to prepare for this role play, imagine Penelope’s situation and what her fears might be: You see your boss as an adversary, who will probably fire you if she finds out you have AIDS. You tend to avoid conflict situations and confrontations. You would rather not say anything to Benita, but fear what will happen if Benita finds out on her own (if you get sick again and Benita checks your medical records). You may have to hire a lawyer. Wouldn't it be easier to stay home and get family benefits (welfare) for medical reasons? What if someone at the restaurant gets HIV and it is your fault? What about finding another type of work?
Once in the role play, be cooperative with Ahmad and allow him to lead the process. The content, however, will come from your own heart.
AHMAD’S CONFIDENTIAL FACTS:
To prepare for this role play, review your notes on this chapter. Identify at least three theoretical concepts that you want to incorporate into your intervention with Penelope. Consider preparing by drawing a decision tree to help you identify possible alternatives for Penelope. Also, consider whether the conflict between Penelope and Benita is similar to any of the games described in this chapter. How can you help Penelope approach the game with Benita in a more constructive fashion?
In this role play, you view yourself as a conflict consultant to Penelope. You can either present her with suggestions or ask questions to facilitate insights about how to handle her interaction with Benita. Write down some of the strategies you hope to use in the role play.
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS:
What concepts from decision-making theory did Ahmad try to employ? Which of these efforts were successful? What other concepts might have been useful? What type of game did Penelope originally envision when she thought about whether to tell Benita she had AIDS? How could Penelope approach Benita with a more constructive game?
Role Play 3.3: "Government Grant Game"
The three roles for this exercise are Dr. Hammel (Director of Conflictia Hope Hospital), Dudley Drummond (Director of Diversity Plus Social Services), and Ms. Prince (Principal of Conflictia High School). The government of Conflictia is concerned about cross-cultural tension in the community. It has offered a grant to social agencies that are willing and able to develop programs to promote cultural harmony. Conflictia Hope, Diversity Plus and Conflictia High each submitted a proposal. The available grant money is not large enough to support each of the proposals. The government proposes grants of $230,000 to Conflictia Hope; $235,000 to Diversity Plus, and $170,000 to Conflictia High. Alternatively, the government is willing to offer Conflictia Hope and Diversity Plus a combined grant of $500,000 to develop a joint project (in this case, Conflictia High would get nothing). Finally, if all three agencies cooperate on one project, the government will provide a combined grant of $650,000. If the parties agree to a joint project, then they will need to decide how to apportion the funds between the agencies involved.
The role play is a negotiation between Dr. Hammel, Ms Prince and Dudley Drummond to determine whether they want to take separate grants or ask the government for one of the combined grants. Assume that each agency wants to maximize its share of the grant money. In order to prepare for the role play, each person should consider how game theory applies to the case facts. What are the incentives for you? For each of the other parties? What is your goal in this negotiation? How can you encourage the others to work towards a favorable agreement? You have 30 minutes to come up with an agreement. If the three parties do not reach an agreement, then the government will withdraw the offer to fund the projects.
DEBRIEFING QUESTIONS: What were the preferred solutions for each of the parties? What was the final agreement, if any? What factors led to this result? What factors made cooperation more difficult? What factors made cooperation easier?